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Whitney: Employment Discrimination - The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-The After-Acquired Evidence
Doctrine and its Effect on Recovery in Employment
Discrimination Claims. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).

Thirty-two years ago, the United States Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (1964 Act).' Three years later it enacted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).2 Under Title VII of
the 1964 Act, an employer is prohibited from making employment decisions based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion.3 The ADEA
is designed to prohibit discrimination by an employer based on the age of
an employee or applicant for employment.'
Christine McKennon filed suit under the ADEA against Nashville
Banner Publishing Company (Banner) on May 6th, 1991.1 McKennon had
been employed by Banner for over thirty years. 6 At the age of sixty-two
she was fired, purportedly due to overall reductions in workforce.7
McKennon insisted that her termination was a result of her age and therefore a violation of the ADEA.' During McKennon's pre-trial deposition,
Banner discovered that she had copied and removed confidential documents from the company files.9 McKennon's explanation for this misconduct was that she feared Banner would fire her because of her age and
thus copied the documents as a type of "insurance."" ° After her deposition, Banner sent McKennon a letter stating that she had violated company policy by copying and removing the documents, and had it known of
her misconduct, it would have fired her immediately." Banner then

1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975 to 1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-4 (1988)).

2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634
(1988)).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988)).

4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988). An employee may bring an age discrimination claim if he is
between the ages of 40 and 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988).
S. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn.
1992).
6. Id. at 605.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id. As secretary to the comptroller of Banner, MeKennon had access to confidential financial documents. Id.
10. Id.at 606.
11.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883 (1995).
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moved for summary judgment, conceding for purposes of the motion that
it discriminated against McKennon. 2 The district court granted the motion
and held that after-acquired evidence, the discovery of McKennon's misconduct, was grounds for termination and a bar to all recovery. 13 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. ' 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the
proper role of after-acquired evidence in an employment discrimination
case.'" The Court unanimously held that this type of evidence is not a
complete bar to recovery. 6 The after-acquired evidence does act as a
limitation on relief that a court may grant. 7 Specifically, the evidence
precludes the recovery of front pay and reinstatement" and permits
backpay only until the time the misconduct is discovered.' 9
This casenote examines the decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Company from five perspectives. First, it describes the differing
views on the use of after-acquired evidence among the circuit courts before
the Supreme Court decision in McKennon. Secondly, it reviews the Court's
holding in McKennon. It then discusses whether the decision is sufficient in
light of the Acts involved. The note also addresses pertinent questions left
unanswered by the McKennon decision. Finally, this note will discuss the
application of the McKennon decision to Wyoming law.
BACKGROUND

The ADEA and Title VII of the 1964 Act were enacted in an effort
to eliminate discriminatory conduct in the workplace.' Both Title VII and

12. McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 606. Banner argued that it was entitled to summary judgment
even assuming it discriminated against McKennon, since her misconduct would have resulted in termination had it been discovered during her employment. Id.
13. Id.

14. MeKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d. 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1993).
15. McKennwn, 115 S. Ct. at 883.

16. Id.at 884.
17. Id.at 886.
18. Id.Front pay is compensation to the employee which runs from the date of the judgment to
the date the employee is put into his/her rightful place or some other date determined by the court.
ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 10.1, at 346 (1992). Rein-

statement puts the employee back into the job he/she would have been in without the discriminatory
conduct of the employer. ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 7.1,
at 219 (1992).

19. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886. Back pay is defined as the difference between what the employee would have made absent the discrimination and what the employee actually made. BELTON,
supra note 18, § 7.1 at 219.
20. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884. See also, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
(1979) (stating that the purpose is the elimination of discrimination in the workplace), Albemarle Pa-
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the ADEA act to deter employer discrimination as well as to compensate
victims .21

Victim compensation comes in several forms. Under the ADEA the
court may grant, without limitation, "judgments compelling employment,
reinstatement or promotion," or enforce "the liability for amounts deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation."' In a
Title VII discrimination claim, Congress authorized the courts to award
such equitable relief as they deem appropriate.23 The court may award but
is not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
backpay, or any other equitable relief it deems appropriate.' Under the
1991 amendments to Title VII, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, inconvenience, and mental anguish that result from an employer's
intentional discrimination are now available-to an employee who proves
an employer's liability.' The question before the Court in McKennon was
the extent to which relief in an employment discrimination case may be
limited or barred completely by using the after-acquired evidence doctrine."
The after-acquired evidence doctrine emerged as a defense in employment discrimination cases in response to what are commonly
called "mixed motive cases."' Under this doctrine an employer attempts to use the after-acquired evidence to eliminate liability for what
would otherwise be unlawful conduct.' After-acquired evidence is
either evidence of an applicant's or employee's dishonesty on an application/resume or, an employee's misconduct in connection with the
workplace.29 The evidence of dishonesty or misconduct is unknown to
the employer at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct." Usually the evidence is
only discovered as a result of an employment
31
discrimination suit.

per Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-19 (1975) (serving as a spur or catalyst to cause employers to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices).
21. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884. See also, H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (purpose of Title VII). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 805,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214 (Purpose of ADEA).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
24. Id.

25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
26. See infra note 28-31 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 36-45 and accompanying text.
28. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Company, 31 F.3d 1221, 1222 (1994).

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Prior to McKennon, conflicting lines of authority had developed in
the circuit courts on the use of after-acquired evidence in employment
discrimination cases. As explained in more detail below, there were two
basic lines of authority. The majority view generally held that if the afteracquired evidence was "material," 32 the plaintiff was barred from all recovery.33 The minority view, on the other hand, only allowed the evidence to limit recovery.'M Within the later view there were variations on
the effect after-acquired evidence would have on backpay recovered by a
plaintiff. 5
A. Mixed Motive Cases
The after-acquired evidence doctrine arose as a result of the mixed
motive case. A case is referred to as a mixed motive case when an employer makes an employment decision based on both a legitimate and an
illegitimate reason.26 In Mt. Healthy City School DistrictBoard of Education v. Doyle,37 a First Amendment mixed motive case, the Court held
that an employer can escape liability by showing that the same decision
would have resulted even absent the employer's unlawful basis for the
decision. 3"
A prima facie case of unlawful conduct is made if the employee can
show that his conduct was constitutionally protected and the employer's
unlawful conduct played a substantial part in the employment decision.3 9
The court goes on to determine whether the "same decision" would have
resulted absent the protected conduct. 40
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court clarified the
"same decision" test from Mt. Healthy and extended its coverage to
claims brought under federal anti-discrimination statutes. 4' The Court ex-

32. See infra note 59, 60 and accompanying text.
33. See infra
note 44-60 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 61-78 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 63.
36. McKennon, 115 S.Ct. at 885.
37. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
38. Id. at 287. Doyle, an untenured teacher, was terminated for obscene gestures made to
female students (legitimate reason) and for making a phone call to a local radio station with regard to
a teachers dress code (illegitimate reason). Id. at 283-84 n. 1.
39. id. at 287.
40. Id.
41. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Ann Hopkins brought a sex discrimination action against Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm, after her partnership candidacy was put on hold and partners in her
office later refused to repropose the candidacy. Id. at 231-32. Price Waterhouse justified its employment decision based on Hopkins' lack of interpersonal skills. Id. at 236. The lower court found that
despite the legitimate reason given for the employment decision, Price Waterhouse unlawfully dis-
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plained that the employer's showing is "most appropriately deemed an
affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point
and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another." 42 If the employer is successful in showing that the employment decision would have been the same without the discriminatory motive the
employer is not held liable for discrimination. 43
B. Majority View on After-acquiredEvidence
Prior to the McKennon decision, a majority of courts held that afteracquired evidence completely barred recovery in employment discrimination cases.' The rationale to this view was that, in light of the evidence,
an employee could not claim to have been injured by the discriminatory
conduct of the employer. 45 The courts held that if an employer showed
that the discovered misconduct would have lead to termination it is irrelevant whether the employee was discriminated against. 4
The majority view is articulated in Summers v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 47 Summers involved a claim of age and religious discrimination. 48 The district court granted State Farm Mutual

criminated against Hopkins because of her sex. Id. at 236-37. The lower court further held that the
employer could avoid equitable relief with clear and convincing evidence that the same decision
would result absent the discrimination. Id. at 237.
42. Id. at 246. Fearing that this decision, as well as other recent Supreme Court decisions,
undermined protections against intentional employment discrimination, Congress enacted The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of
title 42 U.S.C.). See also, H.R. Rep. No.40,102d Cong., 1st Sess., Tit. II, at 17 (1991), reprintedin
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710 (this Act was in response to the recent Supreme Court decisions in the
mixed motive cases). The 1991 Act effected several other areas of discrimination law besides the
mixed motive cases in employment discrimination. Id. Under the 1991 Act, even if the employer is
able to demonstrate that the same employment decision would result absent the discrimination, there
is a violation of Title VII because of the underlying discriminatory reason. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(Supp. V 1993). However, if the employer can show his decision was based in part on a legitimate
reason, the employee's relief may be limited. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). See also, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 712.
43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
44. See e.g., Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); Summers v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988): Smallwood v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984); Millegan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d
302 (6th Cir. 1992); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit
turned away from the majority view in 1993. See e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
45. Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.
1988).
46. See e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th
Cir. 1992).
47. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 702.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 18
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

Automobile Insurance Co.'s (State Farm) motion for summary judgment
and denied any recovery by Summers.4 9 The court based its decision on
after-acquired evidence of insurance claim falsification.' The claim falsification would have been sufficient grounds for termination had the employer known about it prior to Summer's discharge."1
The Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision in Mt. Healthy
to affirm the lower court holding.5 2 While acknowledging that the after-acquired evidence could not have been the "cause" of Summers' discharge, the
court held that the evidence was relevant to the issue of "injury." 53 The court
explained that this type of case is not concerned with the reason for the
discharge but rather with the significance of the additional evidence.' The
issue to be resolved under Summers is whether the claim is actionable at all
in light of the after-acquired evidence.5 5 When after-acquired evidence is used
under the Summers rule, the discriminatory conduct of the employer is admitted or at least assumed. 6
Since the Summers decision, courts subscribing to the majority view
have allowed after-acquired evidence as a bar to employer liability in
cases of resume and/or application fraud as well as in cases involving onthe-job misconduct.5 7 The rule was applied to application fraud by the
Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.5
Honeywell argued that had it known of misrepresentations made by Johnson, it never would have hired her. 9 Agreeing with Honeywell's position,

49. Id.
50. Id. at 703. While preparing for trial, State Farm discovered 150 falsifications on insurance claim
forms made by Summers. Id. Eighteen of the falsifications occurred after Summers returned from a probationary period. Id. Based on this after-acquired evidence, discovered four years after Summers' dismissal,
State Farm moved for summary judgment. Id. State Farm argued that even though the falsifications were

unknown at the time of dismissal and were therefore not the cause of the employment decision they should
be considered in determining what, if any, relief Summers could receive. Id. at 704.

51. Id. at 708.
52. Id. at 705-06.
53. Id. at 708.
54. Id. at 704-05. The after-acquired evidence does not affect the prima facie showing of an
employment discrimination claim. Id. See also, McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973). In an employment discrimination claim the plaintiff first has the burden of proving a
prima facie case of discrimination. Once the employee demonstrates discrimination, the burden shifts
to the employer to show a legitimate reason for the employment decision. The employee then has the
opportunity to show the employer's reason is simply pretext for his discrimination. Id.
55. Summers, 864 F.2d at 705.
56. Id. at 708.
57. See e.g., Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); MilleganJensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992).
58. 955 F.2d 409 (1992) (applying the Summers holding to a state civil rights act rather than a
federal antidiscrimination statute).
59. Id. at 414. In applying for the job with Honeywell, Johnson answered an ad which speci-
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the court stated that summary judgment was appropriate in this situation
because the misrepresentation was "material, directly related to measuring
a candidate for employment, and was relied upon by the employer in
making the hiring decision."'
C. The Minority View on After-Acquired Evidence
The minority view on after-acquired evidence allowed the evidence
to be used at the remedy phase of an employment discrimination suit. 6
The courts held that in light of the evidence neither reinstatement nor
front pay should be awarded.' The backpay was also limited although
there were variations among the courts on the method of determining how
this remedy should be limited.63
The Third Circuit addressed the after-acquired evidence issue in
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co.' The employee in Mardell
alleged violations of both the ADEA and Title VII.' The court of appeals rejected the Summers rule.' The court distinguished the afteracquired evidence case from the mixed motive cases relied on by the
Summers court.67 The court emphasized the fact that the "legitimate
reason" articulated in the after-acquired evidence case is unknown to
the employer at the time of the employment decision.s In the mixed
motive cases the employer is acting on a "legitimate reason" as well as
a discriminatory reason at the time of the employment decision.'u The
Third Circuit explained that the only question to be answered at the

fled education requirements for the job. Id. Johnson represented that she had the qualifications to
satisfy the educational requirements. Id.
60. Id.
61. See e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994); Kristufek v.
Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d
1174 (1lth Cir. 1992).
62. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1239-1240.
63. See e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Company, 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993)
(cutting off back pay at the time of discovery of the after-acquired evidence); Wallace v. Dunn
Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992) (allowing backpay to run to the date employer shows
the evidence would have been discovered).
64. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994). Harleysville Life Insurance, Co. (Harleysville) terminated
Mardell based on her failure to meet quotas and hired a younger male to replace her. Id. at 1223.
During the course of discovery, Harleysville found several instances of application misrepresentation
by Mardell concerning her education and work background. Id. Based on this evidence Harleysville
granted, arguendo, that it discriminated against Mardell but moved for summary judgment based on

the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Id. at 1224.
65. Id. at 1222.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1228.

68. Id. at 1228-29.
69. Id.
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liability stage "is whether the employer discriminated against the
employee on the basis of an impermissible factor at the instant of the
adverse employment action. "70
The Third Circuit held that after-acquired evidence is relevant at the
remedy stage.71 At this stage the employer has the opportunity to demonstrate
that the evidence would have been discovered in the normal course of business.' This showing can be made, for example, by demonstrating that the
customary procedure followed in all processing of applications would uncover
any misrepresentations.73 Under this scheme, backpay would end on the date
the employer proves that the evidence would have been discovered. 74 It must
also be established that the misconduct was severe enough to lead to termination.75 If the employer can not show that the evidence would have been
uncovered absent litigation backpay would run till the date of judgment.76
In Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Company, Toastmaster Division, the Seventh Circuit held that backpay should be allowed to run only
until the date the employer discovered the evidence.' In making this
by
determination the court stated that there was "nothing to be gained
78
further penalizing Hussmann after [the] resume fraud came to light."
PRINCIPAL CASE

In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. the Supreme Court

resolved the split in the circuits regarding after-acquired evidence.79 The
70. Id. at 1228.
71. Id. at 1238-39.
72. Id. at 1240.
73. Id. It should be noted that the employee has the opportunity to show that the employer has
a practice of investigating only or primarily only the members of a protected class which may itself
violate Tide VII and the ADEA. Id. at 1238 n.31.
74. Id. at 1240.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1239. In employment discrimination the 'normal rule' when awarding backpay is to
allow the relief to run to the date of judgment or a date the court deems appropriate. Id.
77. 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). The employee in Kristufek alleged he was terminated because of his age and for retaliatory reasons. Id. at 366. Kristufek was employed with Hussmann
Foodservice Company, Toastmaster Division (Hussmann) from 1981 to 1986 as Director of Employee
and Community Relations and was fifty-seven when terminated. Id. When interviewed for employment, Kristufek represented that he had a Bachelor of Science degree in business administration and
that he had taken graduate courses. Id. Kristufek admitted the falsity of his educational claims during
the course of his deposition. Id. The district court granted Hussmann's JNOV as a result of the evidence discovered during Kristufek's deposition. Id. at 369.
78. Id. at 371.
79. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F.
Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099,
rev'd 115 S.Ct. 879 (1995).
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Court rejected the Summers rule and its reliance on Mt. Healthy.8° In resolving McKennon's suit, the Court held that Mt. Healthy was "inapposite" because an unlawful motive was the only basis for McKennon's discharge.8 ' With this in mind the Court noted that since the evidence of
misconduct was discovered after McKennon's termination, it could not
have been the cause of her discharge.82 Relying on its decision in Price
Waterhouse, the Court held that showing the employment decision would
have been justified had the evidence been known at the time of termination, is not the equivalent to showing the same decision could have been
made."
To support its holding the Court examined the purposes of the
ADEA and Title VII. It concluded that the use of after-acquired evidence at the liability stage to completely bar recovery would not further
these purposes.' The Court held, however, that the evidence does become
relevant at the remedy stage. This is not because the employee should be
punished for her misconduct, but rather because the employer's legitimate
business interests must be taken into account.'6 A limitation on the relief
available to a prevailing plaintiff in this situation allows an employers
interests to be taken into account.8 7
The Court noted that trial courts have discretion to grant equitable
relief that may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the ADEA. An
instruction to determine whether the evidence would have been severe
enough to cause termination, in the Courts opinion, balanced the interests
of both parties.8 9 The Court held, however, as a general rule in afteracquired evidence cases, neither reinstatement nor front pay are appropriate remedies." As to the proper measure for backpay, the Court stated
that it should run from the time of the unlawful termination to the point

80. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
81.

Id.

82. Id.
83.

Id.

84. Id. at 884. See supra note 20-21 and accompanying text.
85.

Id.

86. Id. at 886.
87. Id. The Court noted the prerogatives and discretion an employer has in making hiring,
promotion and termination decisions in the course of running a business. Id. Further, the Court stated
that "[i]t would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer
would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds." Id.
88.

Id. The Court specifically refers to the ADEA in this instance but the discussion of Title

VII and the ADEA's shared featured and common purposes indicates an intention to apply the holding
to both Acts. Id. at 884.
89. Id. at 886-87.
90. Id. at 884.
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the employer actually discovers the employee misconduct. 9 The Court

concluded that any fear of an employer over-investigating an employee's
background to find some evidence that would reduce the amount of recovery is alleviated by the court's authority to award attorney fees and impose sanctions under Rule 11. 92
ANALYSIS

A. Purpose of the Acts
The Court in McKennon emphasized the purpose of the ADEA and
Title VII in making its decision.' The purpose of both Acts is ultimately:
1) to deter employers from practicing discriminatory conduct when making employment decisions and 2) to compensate persons who have been
injured by an employer's conduct.'
Fulfillment of the first purpose is achieved by the disclosure of
violations of the antidiscrimination acts in the litigation process whether
or not any relief is granted.' The litigation process not only vindicates a
wronged employee but it exposes the wrongdoer's action to the entire
community.' It is true, of course, that without the compensation relief,
few employees could afford to pursue such claims.
The second purpose, compensation, is accomplished by making the
wronged employee whole. The make-whole aspect is achieved by placing
the employee in the same position she would have been in absent the
injury caused by the discrimination.' The Summers no-recovery rule is
based on the rationale that make-whole relief is unwarranted because the
employee suffers no injury in light of the after-acquired evidence.9' This

91. Id.
92. Id. at 887. Rule 11 refers to the ability of the court to impose appropriate sanctions on an
attorney. FED. R. CIv. P. I I(c). Under this rle the sanctions may be imposed when the court determines that representations to the court have been made for such improper purposes as to harass or
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in cost of litigation; FED. R. CIv. P. 1l(b)(1); when the
claims, defenses or legal contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a frivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2); when the allegations and other factual contentions do not have evidentiary support or, are not likely to have that
support after reasonable opportunity for investigation or discovery; FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2); and
denials of facts are not warranted on the evidence or, are not reasonably based on a lack of information and belief: FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(4).
93. McKnnon, 115 S. Ct. at 884-85.
94. Id.at 884.
95. Id.at 885.
96. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1235.
97. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181.
98. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
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reasoning makes it necessary to examine what constitutes an injury for the
purpose of the employment discrimination statutes.
One result of discrimination in the employment realm is economic
loss." Courts following the Summers rule assume that the employee suffers no economic loss because had the employer known of the misconduct, she would have been terminated anyway and would be in the same
economic position. This rule considers the employers interest but ignores
the employees injury."ul The McKennon Court states that the employer
can not be required to ignore the after-acquired evidence.' "' However,
denial of reinstatement and front pay allows the employers interest to be
considered."eo By allowing the employee to recover backpay from the time
of the wrongful termination to the point of discovery, the make-whole
policy is satisfied at least under the assumption that the employer would
have discovered the evidence absent the litigation process. This rule
attempts to account for both the employers and the employee's interests.
The Court does not seem concerned, however, with the fact that the
employer may not have discovered the evidence absent the discrimination
suit. 3 A general rule to cut backpay off at the time the employer discovers the evidence during litigation without a demonstration that the evidence would have been discovered at that time absent litigation rewards
the employer for his wrongdoing.3 4 This rule also does not necessarily
put the employee in the same position she would have occupied absent the
employer's discriminatory conduct. That is, absent the discriminatory
conduct there would have been no litigation and perhaps no occasion to
discover the employee's misconduct. The Third Circuit's holding in

99. An example of economic loss is the difference between wages received before the discriminatory conduct and that received after the conduct. See supra note 18-19.
100. There is no reason to require an employer to continue the employment of an employee
who has been demonstrated to be unqualified or disqualified for employment. Once an employer
demonstrates that the evidence would have been discovered absent litigation, there are no future
wages that are lost as a consequence of the discrimination. Samuel A. Mills, Note, Toward an
Equitable After-Acquired Evidence Rule, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1552, 1556 (1994). See
also, Cheryl K. Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination

Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 207 (noting that an employer has the right to make legal employment decisions and
may lawfully discharge an employee).
101.

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.

102. See supra note 87.
103. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886. "Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that
would lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even
if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the informa-

tion might have gone undiscovered absent the suit." Id.
104. See e.g., Christine Neylon O'Brien, Employment Discrimination Claims Remain Valid
Despite After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Wrongdoing, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 65, 122 (1995).
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Mardell, which requires the employer to show that the discovered misconduct was severe enough to result in the same action, and that the evidence
would have been uncovered absent the litigation is a more equitable approach.' t ' This method preserves both the interests of the employee and
the employer.
B. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
In its determination of how after-acquired evidence should effect the
relief available to a prevailing plaintiff the McKennon Court did not address awarding compensatory or punitive damages. Courts should recognize that discrimination causes its victims to suffer harms besides lost
wages. 0t Compensatory damages that might be awarded include but are
not limited to, damages for emotional pain, suffering and mental an0 Even if the court determines that the employer would have made
guish. 1
the same decision based on the after-acquired evidence, it does not follow
that the employee has not been injured beyond lost wages as a result of
the employer's conduct.'0
An award of punitive damages is proper under Title VII when an
employer engages in a discriminatory practice "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual. " " Because punitive damages are designed to punish and

deter, courts should look exclusively at the actions of the employer. An
employee's misconduct should play no part in this determination when the
employer's intentional discrimination has been shown."'

105. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240. See also, Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (1lth
Cir. 1992). The EEOC recently responded to the McKennon holding with enforcement guidelines
requiring backpay to continue until the judgment unless the employer shows that the same decision
would have been made based on the after-acquired evidence. EEOC: Guidanceon After-Acquired Evidence, 8 Lab. Rd. Rep. (BNA) No. 788 at 405:7331 (Dec. 14, 1995). The calculation of backpay
may be affected, however, if the evidence is discovered as a result of a retaliatory investigation in
response to the discrimination suit. Id.
106. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The availability of relief for harms suffered beyond lost wages depends on the particular statute involved in the claim. The ADEA
provides for liquidated damages if the discrimination is willful. 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1988).
107. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
108. See e.g., Zemelman, supra note 100, at 206. ("[Plersonal injuries do not cease on the date
an employer discovers after-acquired evidence.").
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
110. See e.g., Russell v. Microdyne Corporation, 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) (prevailing
plaintiff is eligible for compensatory and punitive damages regardless of whether the doctrine of afteracquired evidence applies); see also, Mills, supra note 100, at 1551 (1994) (relying on EEOC guidelines and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, after-acquired evidence should not bar recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages); in response to McKennon, however, EEOC guidelines allow compensatory
damages for emotional harm to continue past the discovery of the evidence if the employee can show

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss2/18

12

Whitney: Employment Discrimination - The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

1996

CASENOTES

C. Attorneys' Fees

The 1964 Act provides that Attorneys' fees may be awarded at the
courts discretion to the prevailing party in a civil rights action."' In cases

where after-acquired evidence is successfully used the question becomes,
is that employee a prevailing party and thus entitled to attorneys' fees?
The Supreme Court defined prevailing party in Hensley v.
Eckerhart."' Hensley involved the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees

Awards Act (Attorneys' Fees Awards Act) rather than Title VII or the
ADEA." 3 However, the policy of awarding attorneys' fees under Title

VII and the ADEA is similar to that of the Attorneys' fees Awards
Act." 4 The Hensley Court stated, for purposes of awarding attorneys'
fees, plaintiffs have prevailed "if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing the suit."" 5 It is not required that a plaintiff receive all the
relief requested to be considered the prevailing party. 1 6 However, in
determining reasonable attorneys' fees the court must look at the extent of success as it relates to the amount of the fee requested." 7 The
court has the discretion to limit the attorneys' fees awarded when a
plaintiff achieves only limited success."'
The McKennon Court addressed the issue of awarding attorneys' fees in

that the employer's actions caused the harm and that the harm continued past the discovery of the
evidence. EEOC: Guidance an After-Acquired Evidence, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 788 at
405:7331, (Dec. 14, 1995). These guidelines also allow punitive damages in after-acquired evidence
cases when the employee can show the employment decision was discriminatory and the employer
acted with malice or when the evidence was discovered as a result of retaliation. Id. Neither punitive
or compensatory damages are available under the ADEA. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. Under Tide VII attorneys' fees are awarded to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 and Supp. V 1993). The prevailing plaintiff(s) under the ADEA are
awarded reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to any judgment received. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b)
(1988).
112. 461 U.S. 424 (1983). The plaintiffs brought an action against a state hospital challenging
the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the hospital. Id. at 426. The district court held that
the plaintiffs were prevailing parties even though they did not succeed on every claim and granted the
request for an award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 428.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
114. See e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (awarding attorney fees in U.S.C.
VII).
§ 1988 was patterned after those in Title
115. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978)). The Court held that when a party fails to prevail on a claim distinct in all respects from the
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded from the reasonable
fee. Id. at 440.
116. Id. at 435-36 n.lI.
117. Id. at 439-40.
118. Id. at 440.
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the context of preventing employers from excessively investigating an
employee's background." 9 According to the Court, the ability to award
attorneys' fees along with the court's discretion to invoke Rule 11 will prevent employers from abusing the availability of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine."'° The Court did not elaborate on how awarding attorneys' fees will
have this effect or the policy behind awarding this relief.
The possibility of limiting attorneys' fees because of limited success
could work to encourage an employer to investigate an employee's background rather than to discourage such action as the McKennon Court suggests. When an employee brings a discrimination claim, the relief most
often sought is reinstatement, front pay and backpay."' If an employer
introduces after-acquired evidence and the court finds it sufficient,
backpay will be cut off on the date the employer discovered the evidence.
Under these circumstances relief in the form of reinstatement and front
pay will be lost as well. In the court's discretion that limitation on the
success of the employee's claim may be enough to allow the attorneys'
fees to be limited as well.
The issue of awarding attorneys' fees in an after-acquired evidence
case was addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Kristufek v. Hussmann
Foodservice Co.", Along with declaring that backpay should be cut off at
the point of discovery, the Kristufek court stated that attorneys' fees
should also be cut off at that point.' This approach does not take into
account the fact that the after-acquired evidence should have no effect on
the liability of the employer."2 It is a very real possibility that a plaintiff
in this type of case will incur attorneys' fees in connection with showing
liability after the employer discovers the evidence.
It might be argued that allowing an employee in an after-acquired
evidence case to recover attorneys' fees past the date of the discovery
punishes the employer and rewards the employee for her own misconduct."2 However this is not the case since reinstatement and front pay are
denied in light of the after-acquired evidence.

119. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887.
120. Id.

121. See supra note 22-25 and accompanying text.
122. Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 371.
123. Id.
124. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.

125. See supra notes 87 and 100.
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D. After-Acquired Evidence and Wyoming Law
The issue of after-acquired evidence as applied in McKennon has
been addressed by the Tenth Circuit as recently as December 18th, 1995
in Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corporation.26 Duart alleged four caused of
action: 1) violation of the ADEA, 2) breach of contract and promissory
estoppel, 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 4) breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing."2 Duart's ADEA claim was the only
federal question involved in the case, the three additional claims were
based on Wyoming law." The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted FMC Wyoming Corporation's (FMC) motion
for summary judgment on all four claims.' 29 The district court based its
decision on after-acquired evidence of misrepresentations make by Duart
its' conclusion
on his resume and employment application." 3 In reaching
3
the district court relied on O'Driscoll v. Hercules.' 1
On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the Supreme
Court holding in McKennon and the subsequent remand of O'Driscoll for
consideration in light of McKennon. 32 With these decisions in mind, the
court stated that after-acquired evidence is not a basis for summary judgment on Duart's ADEA claim."' The court explained that it was uncertain
whether the McKennon rule would effect possible recovery by an employee on the claims brought under Wyoming law. "
126. 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.at 117.
128. Id.
129. Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corporation, 859 F. Supp. 1447, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1994).
130. Id. at 1456. The court held that the misrepresentations were material and that had FMC
been aware of them when they hired Duart they would be sufficient grounds for termination. Id. In
the alternative, disregarding the after-acquired evidence, the district court held that summary judgment was appropriate on the ADEA claim because FMC demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for termination, unsatisfactory job performance. Id. at 1457. The circuit court affirmed the
alternative holding. Duart, 72 F.3d at 120.
131. Id at 119. O'Driscoll v. Hercules, 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in
O'Driscoll alleged violations of the ADEA. Id. at 177. The court granted Hercules summary judgment based on after-acquired evidence that O'Driscoll had made misrepresentations on her employment application. Id. at 178.
132. Duart, 72 F.3d at 119-20.
133. rd. at 120.
134. Id. The court did, however, affirm the lower courts decision to grant summary judgment to
FMC on the claims brought under Wyoming law. Id.The district court granted FMC summary judgment on Duarts claim of breach of contract and promissory estoppel based on the fact that Duart was
an at-will employee and nothing in the employer's documents or workbooks changed that employment
status to a contractual relationship. Duart, 859 F. Supp. at 1458-1462. On the claim of breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing, the district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate
because Duart had not demonstrated that FMC had acted with "extremely outrageous or venal conduct." Id. at 1464. FMC had not violated "community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
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Although this note is written in the context of employment discrimination law, the Tenth Circuits' mention of how McKennon might be
applied to Wyoming law justifies a brief discussion on that subject. Wyoming is an at-will employment state. 135 The Wyoming courts have recognized exceptions to the at-will employment rule including actions premised on violations of public policy. 136 For an employee to prevail on a
claim that an employer's action was a violation of public policy it must be
established that: 1) the action was a violation of a well-established public
policy; and 2) there is no other available remedy to protect the interest of
the employee or society."'3 The Wyoming courts note that the purpose for
on violations of public policy is to vindiallowing a tort claim premised
38
policies.
social
valuable
cate
The at-will status of employment can be altered when an employment contract states a definite duration.'39 This creates a presumption of
dismissal for cause only."'4 The altered employment status along with
other factors such as longevity of employment creates a special relationship between the employer and employee. 4 ' Under Wyoming law, the
demonstration of a special relationship establishes an actionable tort claim
of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 42
The issue of applying after-acquired evidence to tort claims brought by
an at-will employee or an employee by contract has not been addressed in
Wyoming courts. The question did arise in Weissman v. CraufordRehabili-

ness." Id. Finally, the court held that summaly judgment should be granted to FMC on the claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress because Duart did not allege any facts to show the infliction
of serious bodily harm or death. Id.
135. See e.g., Drake v. Cheyenne Newspaper, Inc., 891 P.2d 80, 81 (Wyo. 1995). An at-will
employee is employed for an indefinite period of time and either party can end the employment relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all. Id.
136. See e.g., Id. at 80; Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985); Wilder v.
Cody County Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994).
137. Allen, 891 P.2d at 284. The other remedies available to a Wyoming employee include the
Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965 and, of course, any of the applicable federal
antidiscrimination statutes. Id.
138. Id. at 284.
139. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 217. An employment contract can be created by either an express or
implied in fact contract. Id. at 216. The express contract is created by writing or orally at the time the
contract is formed. Id. An implied in fact contract results from the acts or conduct of the parties
involved. Id.
140. Id. at 217.
141. Id. at 221-22.
142. Id. at 222. The court recognized the line of cases reserving the decision on whether a
claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under Wyoming law
and declared that it was time to decide the issue. Id. at 220. See e.g., Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co.,
813 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1991); Nelson v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989); Reese
v. Dow Chemical Co., 728 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1986).
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tation Services, Inc., a Colorado case involving wrongful discharge based
upon retaliation in violation of public policy. 14 The plaintiff in Weissman
asserted retaliatory discharge as a result of her contact with the Division of
Labor.'" The district court granted Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc.
(Crawford) summary judgment based on after-acquired evidence of resume
misrepresentation. 45 Relying on McKennon, the Colorado Court of Appeals
held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.'"
The Court of Appeals concluded that the McKennon "approach
should be used in adjudicating state wrongful discharge tort claims" in the
same way it applies to federal antidiscrimination statutes. "47 The court noted the similarities of tort actions brought in response to violations of
public policy and actions based on legislation designed to deter discrimination in the workplace.'" To demonstrate this the court stated that "lilt
is on less against public policy, for example, to discharge an employee
because that

. . .

employee exercises a legislatively-granted right, than it

49
would be to discharge that same employee because of his or her age."1
With this statement the court recognized the similar motivations behind
allowing public policy claims and federal and state antidiscrimination
claims, deterrence and compensation." s

Relying upon public policy, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized
the tort claim of retaliatory discharge in Griess v. Consolidated Freightways
Corporationof Delaware."' The court stated that a claim of retaliatory discharge based on a violation of public policy is actionable if there is no other
remedy available.' The public policy involved in Griess was the right of an
employee to file a worker's compensation claim." 3 The courts recognition of
the importance of bringing a cause of action for a retaliatory discharge is
analogous to the justification articulated in Weissman for applying the
McKennon approach to employment tort actions."

143. No. 93CA1905, 1995 WL 215557 (Colo. App. Apr. 13, 1995).
144. Weissman, No 93CA1905, 1995 WL 215557 at 2.
145. Id. at 1. Weissman did not list her previous employer on her application, an employer with
whom she had litigation pending. Id.
146. Id. at 4-5.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id,
151. 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989). See also, Allen v. Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo.
1985). Drake v. Cheyenne Newspaper, Inc., 891 P.2d 80 (Wyo. 1995).
152. Griess, 776 P.2d at 753.
153. Id. at 753. The ability to file a worker's compensation claim was held to be a right based
on Wvo. CONST. art. XIX, § 7 and WYO. STAT. § 27-14-104(b). Id.
154. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
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The McKennon approach to after-acquired evidence can also be
applied in suits brought under the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices
Act of 1965 (WFEPA).' 55 The WFEPA provides that an employer may
not base employment decisions on age, sex, race, creed, color, national
origin or ancestry.' 56 An employer is further precluded from basing a
decision on the handicapped status of a person if that person is otherwise
qualified for the job.' 57
The WFEPA provision prohibiting handicapped discrimination was
applied in World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch.'55 Ditsch filed a complaint with the
Fair Employment Commission alleging employment discrimination based
on his handicap.'59 The issue was resolved in favor of Ditsch and World
Mart was ordered to compensate Ditsch in the form of backpay." World
Mart sought judicial review of the commissions order.' 6 ' The court held
that the order was proper and the amount of backpay did not make Ditsch
"'more whole' than he would have been if he had not been the victim of
handicap discrimination."' 62
When deciding whether or not after-acquired evidence should be
applied to actions brought under the WFEPA, the purpose of the remedy should be examined. The courts reference to the 'make whole'
aspect of awarding backpay in Ditsch illustrates the desire to put the
plaintiff in the same position he would have been in absent the litigation. This purpose parallels those of the ADEA and Title VII. The
purpose of the WFEPA would, in a case of after-acquired evidence,
justify the application of the evidence at the remedy stage in the same
manner it is applied in a federal antidiscrimination case."

155.

WYO. STAT. §§ 27-9-101 to-108 (1977).

156. Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105(a)(1) (1977).
157.

Id.

158. 855 P.2d 1228 (Wyo. 1993).
159.

Id. at 1231.

160. Id.at1232. WFEPA authorizes thecommission toissue
orders "requiring the respondent
to cease and desist from discriminatory or unfair employment practice and to take affirmative action,
including hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employment, with or without backpay ... as in the
judgment of the commission will
effectuate
thepurposes of this
chapter." WYO. STAT. § 27-9-106
(1977).
161.

Ditsch, 855 P.2d at 1232. WFEPA authorizes judicial review of a commission order.

Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-107 (1977).
162.

Ditsch, 855 P.2d at 1238.

163. Note, it is the author's contention that the application of after-acquired evidence should be
taken one step further than was done inMcKennon. The employer should be required toshow that
the
evidence would have been discovered absent litigation.
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CONCLUSION

While the Tenth Circuit's Summers rule took into account the employers legitimate interests, it did not consider the injury to the employee.
The injury to an employee caused by the employer's discriminatory conduct and the employees misconduct are separate issues. By taking the
evidence out of the liability stage of an employment discrimination case,
the courts are allowed to recognize the distinction between the employers
actions and the employees misconduct.
The Supreme Court's holding in McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. purports to apply after-acquired evidence in accord with
the purposes of the antidiscrimination laws. McKennon does not go far
enough, however, in requiring determination that the evidence would have
been discovered in the absence of an employment discrimination suit
before it can be used to limit recovery. By not taking this into account the
employee is not necessarily put into the same position she would have
been in absent the discriminatory action.
When deciding how to apply the after-acquired evidence in
McKennon, the purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes played a key
role. In determining how McKennon should apply to Wyoming law the
same considerations must be made. The Wyoming Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of bringing a public policy claim and the make
whole aspect of the WFEPA parallel the purposes of the Acts involved in
McKennon. These similarities warrant the application of the McKennon
holding to Wyoming law.
MICHELLE M. WHITNEY
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